Iyer v. Comm IRS by unknown
2007 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-3-2007 
Iyer v. Comm IRS 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007 
Recommended Citation 
"Iyer v. Comm IRS" (2007). 2007 Decisions. 625. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/625 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2007 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-1539
________________
DEV IYER,
Appellant
v.
MARK W. EVERSON, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE; JOHN P.
SNOW, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
 ____________________________________
On Appeal from the Order of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 04-cv–02259
District Court Judge:  Honorable Anita B. Brody
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 27, 2007
Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND COWEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed : August 3, 2007)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Dev Iyer, proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting partial summary judgment for
Mark Everson, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and John Snow, Secretary of the
Department of the Treasury (together, the “IRS”) on an employment discrimination claim. 
2Iyer also challenges a jury instruction given by the District Court at his subsequent trial. 
We will affirm.
Through counsel, Iyer filed a complaint against the IRS claiming discrimination
based upon his race, religion, sex, national origin, and age under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (“ADEA”), and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). 
Iyer identified himself as a colored Asian, Asian Indian, Hindu, and forty-six years old at
the time of the alleged unlawful acts.  Iyer also asserted retaliation, hostile work
environment, and sexual harassment claims.
The District Court granted the IRS’ motion for partial summary judgment on Iyer’s
EPA claims, his discrimination and retaliation claims related to his application for an
attorney position, his sexual harassment claim, and some of his discrimination claims
related to his application for an industry economist position.  Iyer’s remaining claims
went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the IRS.  The District Court denied Iyer’s
motion to vacate the verdict.  The issues before us in this appeal are whether the District
Court erred in granting summary judgment on Iyer’s claims related to his application for
the attorney position, and whether the District Court erred in instructing the jury, after a
juror asked whether jury members could be subject to retaliation. 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  Fasold v.
Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2005).  The record reflects that Iyer began working as
3an IRS revenue agent in 1991.  In 1998, Iyer received a job reassignment, and he filed a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.  Iyer also filed other
EEOC complaints.  It is unclear from the record how his complaints were resolved.   
In December 2000, Iyer saw a posting at Villanova University Law School for an
attorney position in the IRS Office of Chief Counsel in the Philadelphia Small Business/
Self-Employed Division.  The posting stated that the IRS was seeking applicants who had
recently completed or were currently enrolled in an LLM taxation program, and who were
interested in taxation and litigation.  The posting stated that experience was preferred, but
not absolutely necessary.  Iyer was admitted to the bar, but had no litigation experience, 
had not practiced as a lawyer or clerked for a judge, and had received one grade of F and
at least two Ds at Temple University Law School.  He did not have a LLM.  Iyer applied
for the position, but he was not asked to interview.
Harvey Kesselman, IRS Area Counsel, prepared a memorandum to Thomas
Thomas, the selecting official, recommending that Thomas hire two other applicants,
James Beyer and Jeffrey Venzie.  Beyer graduated cum laude from Temple University
Law School, and he had worked as an attorney for the IRS since 1987.  Beyer’s
experience included estate tax work and labor litigation.  Venzie graduated from Widener
University Law School, where he worked on a law journal.  Venzie worked for a law
firm, clerked for a judge, and was enrolled in a LLM taxation program.  Venzie’s law
school grades were not strong, but he had grades of A and B in the LLM program.  Based
on Kesselman’s memorandum, Thomas approved hiring Beyer and Venzie.  Thomas did
    1McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
    2The District Court also held that Iyer did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because he was not qualified for the attorney position.  We disagree. 
Thomas testified that the minimum job requirement was admission to the bar, and that a
minimum GPA in law school and a LLM were not required.  The posting stated that
experience was not necessary. 
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not interview the candidates, and he did not know the other applicants’ names.  
Absent any evidence of direct discrimination, the District Court properly evaluated
Iyer’s discrimination claims under the McDonnell Douglas1 burden-shifting framework. 
We agree with the District Court that Iyer did not establish a prima facie case of
discrimination because he did not present evidence of circumstances that raise an
inference of discriminatory action.  See Sarullo v. United States Postal Service, 352 F.3d
789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (setting forth elements of prima facie case).  Iyer was required to
establish some causal nexus between his membership in a protected class and the decision
not to hire him.  See id. at 798.  But Iyer’s evidence of discrimination consisted solely of
his own assertion that he was not hired because of his age, race, national origin, or
religion.  See id.  As noted by the District Court, there is no evidence of Beyer’s or
Venzie’s age, race, national origin, or religion, other than Iyer’s testimony that Beyer is
white.  And Iyer submitted evidence establishing that Kesselman did not know Iyer’s
race, national origin, or religion when he reviewed the job applications.2 
The District Court also did not err in granting summary judgment on Iyer’s claim
that he was not hired for the attorney position in retaliation for his EEOC complaints. 
    3Iyer also argues in his brief that the IRS’ job posting was discriminatory because, by
seeking candidates who recently completed or were currently enrolled in an LLM
program, the IRS was seeking younger candidates.  And Iyer argues that Villanova
University graduate students are predominately white.  The District Court correctly
5
Iyer engaged in a protected activity in filing his EEOC complaints.  And the IRS took an
adverse employment action in not hiring him.  But Iyer did not establish a link between
his EEOC complaints and the fact that he was not hired.  See Sarullo, 352 F.3d at 800
(setting forth elements of prima facie case of retaliation).  As the District Court
recognized, Iyer presented no evidence that Kesselman knew about his EEOC filings
when he reviewed his job application.  
We also agree with the District Court that, even if Iyer established prima facie
cases of discrimination and retaliation, he would not have survived summary judgment
because he did not present evidence from which a factfinder could infer that the IRS’
non-discriminatory reason for not hiring Iyer was a pretext.  Id. at 799-800.  The IRS
relied in District Court on the fact that Thomas did not know about Iyer when he decided
to hire Beyer and Venzie.  Although Iyer argues that it was Kesselman who discriminated
against him by not offering him an interview, Iyer produced Kesselman’s affidavit, which
stated that he did not recommend Iyer for an interview because his law school grades
were poor.  Kesselman further attested that, when he reviewed the applications, he did not
know Iyer’s race, religion, or national origin.  And Iyer testified that, when he applied for
the position, he had not met Kesselman.  There is nothing in the record raising a doubt
about Kesselman’s reason for not offering Iyer an interview.3
concluded that, to the extent Iyer brought a disparate impact claim, he presented no
evidence in support of such a claim.
    4The District Court also mentioned that the deputy clerk knew their identities.
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On the juror issue, Iyer contends that the District Court mishandled a juror’s
question about potential retaliation, and that the District Court should have dismissed the
juror who asked the question.  The trial transcript reflects that a juror asked the deputy
clerk how the jury could be sure that they would not be retaliated against.  The District
Court Judge reported the question to the attorneys, told them she did not know which
juror asked the question, and asked the attorneys how they would like to respond.  
The United States Attorney represented that the IRS did not have the jurors’
names.  Iyer’s lawyer stated, “Well, you should tell the jury that the IRS Management
doesn’t have their identities.”  Supp. App. at 139.  The District Court reviewed a jury
instruction with counsel, and then told the jurors that they would not have to account for
their verdict or explain their verdict to anyone.  The District Court stated, “And as far as
who you are, after we choose you, the only person that knows who you are, is I.  In other
words, the – what’s known as the jury sheets are no longer in the possession of any of the
parties.”  Supp. App. at 144-45.4 
We conclude that the District Court did not err in its handling of the juror’s
question.  The District Court’s instruction addressed the juror’s concern, and Iyer’s
lawyer agreed that an instruction was an appropriate response.  Contrary to Iyer’s
    5Iyer’s motion for sanctions against the IRS is denied.
argument, there is no basis to conclude that the jury’s verdict was a result of the jurors’
fear of the IRS.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.5 
